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Grain marketing and National Competition
Policy: reform or reaction?
{
A.S. Watson*
Grain marketing arrangements in Australia have been controversial for many years.
Following an account of the historical background to grain marketing, this article
concentrates on more recent debates. The most interesting technical economic
argument concerns the validity of claims that statutory marketing authorities with
export monopoly powers can obtain higher prices. The article also discusses how
marketing in Australia has been a¡ected by Commonwealth and State Government
policies with respect to microeconomic reform and privatization. Although major
changes appear to have been made in grain marketing and its institutions, there are
inherent economic problems with the current approach to deregulation.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine recent changes to grain marketing
in Australia. Grain policy is contentious in Australia and other countries
because of controversy over the role of government. Those arguments are
even sharper today with the growing reluctance of governments to be
involved in activities that could be undertaken by the private sector. The
continuing importance of statutory marketing authorities (SMAs) in grain
marketing became increasingly anomalous from the early 1990s once
Australian governments began to withdraw from other traditional areas of
government activity in transport, banking, telecommunications and public
utilities. For political and economic reasons, restructuring of the
Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and the Australian Barley Board (ABB)
has proved more di¤cult than disposal of airlines, banks and public
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK or 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 43:4, pp. 429^455
{The comments of Colin Carter, Bill Fisher, Vincent Kelly, Bill Malcolm and Bob
Richardson on an earlier draft of this article entitled `Grain marketing in big hot
countries: implications for big cold countries' are appreciated. This shortened version has
bene¢ted from advice of a Journal reviewer and participants in seminars organised by
the University of California, Davis; Alberta Agriculture, Edmonton; the Canada Grains
Council, Winnipeg; and the Western Australian Branch of the Australian Agricultural
and Resource Economics Society. Copies of the original paper are available on request
(asw@ozemail.com.au).
*A.S. Watson is a freelance economist in Melbourne.utilities. The AWB and ABB have been around for a long time and
are accepted by many graingrowers. Furthermore, it is not obvious
conceptually or pragmatically how trading entities like SMAs should be
privatised.
Commentary on grain marketing is based on divergent criteria and
assumptions in Australia and elsewhere. The `single desk' or export
monopoly powers of the AWB and state-based SMAs are central to the
debate, given their signi¢cance to domestic and international marketing.
Judging from support by graingrowers' organisations, the majority of
Australian producers are convinced that the single desk is in their overall
interest. The debate over the single desk is a mixture of arguments about
questions of fact, economic theory and measurement, and value judgements.
US critics often categorise grain marketing in Australia and Canada as `state
trading' (US General Accounting O¤ce 1996). Australians and Canadians
¢nd characterisation of the AWB and Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) as
state trading enterprises confusing. This applies to supporters and critics of
marketing arrangements. Implicit in such criticism is the belief that single
desk selling is bene¢cial, even if `unfair' and disruptive. While supporters of
single desk selling claim that export monopoly powers confer bene¢ts on the
wheat industry and national economies, this is disputed by domestic critics
of the AWB and CWB who have emphasised the adverse e¡ects of statutory
marketing on marketing costs and business opportunities available to grain
producers and grain users. The controversy over the single desk is discussed
in detail below.
The role of the market is di¡erent in the determination of absolute grain
prices and marketing margins (Watson 1996). Regulated grain markets
may not provide assistance. Australian graingrowers have received negative
assistance for signi¢cant periods. In contrast, the United States and the
European Union have private enterprise grain marketing systems but
government intervention in price determination confers substantial bene¢ts
on farmers. This is one reason Australian graingrowers ¢nd it hard to
understand why the Australian wheat industry is criticised for state
trading.
Agricultural policy is distinguished by con£icts over both content of
policy and the process of its formation (Mauldon 1975, p. 70). The grain
industry has been a test bed in Australia for innovations in institutional
arrangements for agricultural policy advice and policy-making. The latest
experiment has been the National Competition Policy (NCP) introduced
following the Hilmer Report (1993). While it is fashionable to claim that
microeconomic reform is proceeding apace in Australia, progress has
arguably stalled in agricultural marketing. Reasons for this conclusion are
discussed below.
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2.1 Rationale for government involvement
Domberger (1992, p. 165) summarised three arguments for government
involvement in trading enterprises: market failure, social objectives and
commanding heights. To which, Domberger added a fourth ö national-
isation of private enterprises headed for bankruptcy. The fourth observation
did not apply to grain marketing ¢rms, although it was an accurate
description of the situation of grain producers in the great depression when
the push towards regulation of grain marketing was strongest. The plight of
producers in the 1930s was largely the result of government actions in
creating ill-judged soldier settlement schemes (Lake 1987). As pointed out by
Carter and Wilson (1997, p. 88), wars and economic disasters often
precipitate state ownership. The grain industry in Australia and Canada was
part of that general pattern.
In Australia, wartime wheat pools were established under defence powers
during two world wars in response to transport di¤culties (Whitwell and
Sydenham 1991). Given the `free trade' or Section 92 clause of the
Constitution, the power of the Commonwealth to regulate wheat marketing
is limited in peacetime (Coper 1978). A solution was complementary
legislation passed by the Commonwealth and states. Despite this, powers of
the AWB were the subject of occasional legal disputes in the High Court of
Australia. Involvement of the states politicised decision-making even further.
Deregulation of the domestic market is again straining interstate alliances
of governments and graingrowers. Tensions are emerging between the
Commonwealth and the states over the NCP. The politics of grain has a
substantial dose of interstate rivalry, arising from interstate di¡erences in
economic interests based on end-uses of grain, di¡erences in the structure of
farms and jockeying for position in national grain organisations. Similar to
the international politics of grain, the unit of analysis in Australian grain
policy is often a political unit. This is very di¡erent from analysis of the
behaviour of ¢rms, consumers and resource £ows on which economists focus
(Bryan 1991).
Market failure, especially that brought about by natural monopoly,
provides a compelling case for government intervention. Political attitudes
to wheat marketing have little in common with economists' views on
market failure but economic factors have in£uenced the fervour with which
growers' views are held. The possibility of natural monopoly and excessive
market power in the grain trade is worth serious consideration. Natural
monopoly occurs when a single ¢rm can supply output more cheaply than a
number of ¢rms. Natural monopoly is a feature of public utilities like water
supply and distribution. An example of natural monopoly signi¢cant to
Grain marketing and National Competition Policy 431
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999grain is port terminals. Without access rules for terminals, graingrowers
could be disadvantaged by privatisation of the ports. Similarly, access to
grain handling facilities would become an important issue if the grain
marketing system were deregulated. In Australia, Britain and New Zealand,
the usual solution to natural monopoly was public ownership of public
utilities. Some countries, notably the United States, handled problems of
natural monopoly through regulation of privately owned utilities. Until
recently there was bipartisan support in Australia for government
ownership and operation of public utilities as government business
enterprises (GBEs). This was not thought to be inconsistent with a market-
oriented economy. The same political tolerance extended to SMAs for
agricultural commodities. Natural monopoly occurs because of technical
features of production. Natural monopoly also depends on the size of the
market. Thus, existence or non-existence of natural monopoly is not ¢xed
in time in an economic sense. For example, advances in technology have
eliminated natural monopoly in some parts of modern telecommunications.
This explains why Australian governments have begun to divest themselves
of these utilities.
Nor are attitudes to government involvement ¢xed in a political sense.
Frustration at politicians and the bureaucracy at their inability to control
GBEs and SMAs has been expressed. Accountability emerged as a serious
issue for the AWB and other SMAs in the late 1970s (Watson 1983). A
program of reform was pursued with some vigour. There is a problem in
separating two questions: ¢rst, how well is an agency like the AWB
performing its tasks?; and, second, should the AWB have those tasks in the
¢rst place? Failure to maintain this distinction has led to tension between
analysts of grain marketing and those involved in day-to-day operations of
SMAs. Criticism of marketing policy is not the same as criticising those
working for SMAs. Rents associated with natural monopoly are often
dissipated by public utilities and SMAs with favourable conditions for their
workforces and special deals for customers. Featherbedding was rampant in
grain handling and storage in some states. Arrangements between SMAs and
millers and maltsters could not have stood up to close examination. Over
time, public agencies depart from their original purposes. A characteristic of
the public sector is its inability to manage contraction as e¡ectively as private
¢rms. Cashin (1986, p. 14), also writing in the context of the Australian
wheat industry, described forces at work in public agencies as corresponding
to `a life-cycle theory of regulation, with the early years of an agency's life
conforming with the public-interest view, the agency's performance declining
thereafter as the legislature's attention, regulator enthusiasm and public
concern all wane'.
The power of middlemen in agricultural markets has been of concern since
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is treated as an empirical question. It is debatable whether enough of the
grain marketing system is (was?) characterised by natural monopoly and
decreasing costs to justify wholesale government intervention. Setting rail
freights for grain is an area where the economics of public utilities comes to
the fore in grain marketing. Both the Australian and Canadian grain
industries have been bedevilled by loss-making rail systems and disputes over
grain transport. Other parts of grain marketing where natural monopoly is
an issue are storage and provision of market information. There are
economies of size in provision of storage ö notably at the local level. This is
why there is a worldwide tradition of cooperative ownership of storage by
farmers. Statutory authorities were important in grain handling and storage
in some Australian states until the early 1990s. The Australian system of
grain handling and storage eventually came under increasing strain,
culminating in a Royal Commission from 1986 to 1988 (Royal Commission
into Grain Handling, Storage and Transport 1988). The Royal Commission
was a turning point in the debate on grain marketing.
Natural monopoly in storage and abuse of market power were possibly
an issue in the 1930s when grain deliveries were restricted to the nearest local
silo (elevator) but improvements in road transport and cheap on-farm
storage have reduced the signi¢cance of this source of natural monopoly.
Similarly, developments in electronic communication have reduced costs of
generation and transmission of information. Access to information is the key
to competition in grain markets. Modern methods of communication have
enhanced the possibilities of small-scale enterprise in grain marketing. While
it may also have been true that market failure based on de¢ciencies in access
to information was important when the AWB and ABB were created, that
argument is no longer convincing.
2.2 Characteristics of grain marketing in Australia: the early period
Wheat is the dominant crop in Australia. Marketing arrangements for barley
were similar to wheat but arrangements were state-based rather than national.
In Western Australia and Queensland, there are statutory arrangements for
minorcrops.
The traditional system of wheat marketing in Australia had four main
characteristics (Watson 1996):
1. The AWB was the exclusive marketer of wheat within Australia and
for export.
2. A bu¡er fund operated to stabilise prices through taxes on exports at
times of high prices with payments when prices were low.
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and, within the domestic market, between wheat for human con-
sumption and wheat for stock-feed.
4. An elaborate pool-payment system to disburse the net proceeds of sales
on various markets, after allowance for marketing costs and
stabilisation transactions.
The export monopoly of the AWB is the only major feature of this elaborate
system that has survived. All agricultural marketing systems, public or
private, have ¢nancial arrangements to distribute returns to farmers. A pool
payment system is still operated by the AWB but in an attenuated form
compared with earlier versions, which had substantial e¡ects on growers'
£ow of funds. Greater £exibility is now permitted in methods of payment,
with provision for cash sales. Most growers, however, elect to be paid the
pool price.
The bu¡er fund was a serious attempt at stabilisation, at least in theory.
Investigation of bu¡er fund and bu¡er stock approaches to price stabilisation
has been pursued in extraordinary detail. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981)
represent the apotheosis of an extensive theoretical genre. Australian interest
in the economics of stabilisation has been dominated by the previous bu¡er
fund for wheat and the collapse of the reserve price (bu¡er stock) scheme for
wool in 1991. The eventual removal of government guarantees to AWB
borrowing and establishment of the Wheat Industry Fund (WIF) to replace
that concession can be linked to unwillingness by the Commonwealth
Government to continue open-ended commitments to SMAs following the
policy-induced debacle of the wool industry (Watson 1990). The wheat bu¡er
fund also re£ected a judgement that the banking system of the day did not
provide adequate opportunities for savings, investment, borrowing and
lending or that farmers were incapable of managing their own ¢nancial
a¡airs. That judgement can no longer be applied to the Australian ¢nancial
system. However, the whi¡ of paternalism associated with the bu¡er fund in
the wheat industry persists in a di¡erent form in the WIF with the support
of growers' organisations.
A major weakness of the bu¡er fund approach was that the objective
was price stabilisation when yield variability had more signi¢cant e¡ects on
income variability. Money was also transferred between growers by the
interaction of yield variations and timing of payments. The fund penalised
specialist wheatgrowers ö favouring farmers attracted to the wheat industry
by higher prices when payments were made but able to shift to other
enterprises when taxes were collected. Newbery (1993, p. 411) noted that the
bene¢ts of commodity price stabilisation are reduced when farms are
diversi¢ed and produce several commodities. Multiple enterprise farms are
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also destabilised farmers' incomes (Watson and Parish 1982). When world
prices were high, payments from earlier pools were accelerated and vice
versa. Stabilisation was stabilisation in name only. The bu¡er fund was
abolished in 1979 and replaced by a guaranteed minimum price. Individual
records of contributions by growers were introduced when the WIF was
established in 1989 and this removed one problem of the bu¡er fund.
Although the pool payment system has been simpli¢ed, ¢nancing arrange-
ments for wheat have signi¢cant e¡ects on farm ¢nancial organisation. The
cumulative e¡ects of the 2 per cent levy on gross receipts to create the WIF
are substantial.
The traditional system of wheat marketing was characterised by pricing
according to destination and end-use. This was a variant of the home
consumption price scheme, the preferred method of price support in Australia
(Mauldon 1990). Home consumption price schemes increase producer revenue
by diverting supply from the less-elastic domestic market to the export
market. The same result could be achieved by taxes on production to ¢nance
subsidies on exports. Fiscal methods of price support do not create legal
problems and have been used for other agricultural industries. However,
producers and governments prefer SMAs as the instrument of price
discrimination because their activities are less open to public scrutiny.
Home consumption prices for wheat were linked to costs, which inevitably
moved out of line with world prices. Pooling of receipts from di¡erent
markets meant that output decisions of growers were out of line with what
would have been sensible from an economy-wide view. Wheat was di¡erent
from the one-way assistance given to dairy products, eggs and dried vine
fruits. The domestic price of wheat was sometimes below the world price and
the wheat industry then received negative assistance. When domestic wheat
prices were below world prices, intensive livestock industries had access to
cheap wheat. Development of coarse grain industries was impeded by low
domestic wheat prices. At other times, livestock industries were penalised by
high prices. This was another example of unfortunate resource allocation
consequences of a commodity-by-commodity approach to price policy within
a multi-product agricultural system.
Negative assistance to the Australian wheat industry occurred in only a
few years, but when it did happen, costs to wheatgrowers were substantial.
On the more frequent occasions when positive assistance was given to
graingrowers, the price di¡erential between domestic and export prices was
much smaller. This re£ected the classic pattern of price variability in storable
commodities with episodic `spikes' associated with stockouts whereas price
falls can be moderated by stock holding. Growers were thus bound to miss
out from attempts to stabilise prices.
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regulation not delivering the goods to producers. Apart from crying foul
when consumer interests pointed out distributional e¡ects of di¡erential
pricing, wheatgrowers' organisations appeared unconcerned that there were
systematic reasons for the substantial costs borne by producers. Over many
years, the reaction of the organised grain industry has been to defend the
status quo whatever the consequences for growers.
The grain marketing system continues to damage Australia's intensive
livestock industries. In their study of chicken meat, Larkin and Heilbron
(1997, p. 29) partly attributed the higher cost of feed to AWB policies,
arguing that the `absolute cost of domestic feed in Australia is higher
than might be expected for a prominent grain exporting country'. Their
calculations suggest poultry feed is nearly $A100 per tonne dearer in
Australia than the United States. There are other reasons for this, notably
the absence of corn and soya beans from local farming systems. It is not
surprising that interests associated with intensive livestock industries are
campaigning for changes to grain marketing. Consciously or unconsciously,
astute graingrowers support the single desk because of market power on the
Australian market not the world market, as their rhetoric would have it.
2.3 Pooling
The standard work on the AWB (Whitwell and Sydenham 1991) is entitled A
Shared Harvest, a title re£ecting the essence of the pooling principle that price
risks and marketing costs are shared among producers. The way farmers
manage production, marketing and ¢nancial risks is at the core of their
individual business strategies and competition for resources amongst farmers.
Pooling is designed to reduce this competition. Whatever the economic e¡ects
of pooling and statutory marketing, grower equality was paramount for its
supporters. Their other concern was the behaviour of middlemen. Whitwell
and Sydenham (ibid., p. 286) described growers' ambitions for wheat
marketing as involving `three main principles, namely that the pool be com-
pulsory,thatthemarketingorganisationbegrantedmonopolypowersandthat
itbegrower-dominated'.
A minority of producers recognised that pooling restricted farmers' business
opportunities. The only signi¢cant threat to orderly marketing was in the late
1960s and early 1970s, when some growers sought to take advantage of high
domestic prices by selling wheat on the domestic market to avoid dilution of
returns by low export prices. That possibility was restricted to growers located
close to state borders who were tempted to exploit the ambiguity of the powers
of the AWB to control interstate trade. These growers also had more to gain
fromdirectsalesbecausetheirfreightcoststotheseaboardweremuchhigher.
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de¢ning:
equalisation as the process by which returns to producers are averaged
across markets when price discrimination is enforced among them, and
pooling as the process by which returns from the sale of a commodity
during some time period are averaged across participating producers.
Equalisation is an artefact of di¡erential pricing. Equalisation results in
economic costs because producer decisions are based on average prices
rather than the marginal returns from additional production. Economic
e¡ects were serious in the early period of wheat stabilisation when export
prices were much higher than domestic prices. Equalisation reduced
Australian wheat output both directly and indirectly. The direct e¡ect was
the supply response arising from the lower pro¢tability of wheat relative to
other products. The indirect e¡ect was lower investment and reduced
productivity.
Sieper emphasised that pooling is not exclusive to statutory marketing.
Pooling is an insurance contract whereby producers share inter-temporal
price risks. Pooling also arises in private marketing arrangements due to
economic limits to the frequency of price changes. Given uncertainty
surrounding prices, some smoothing of prices is inevitable and desirable.
Why pooling has to be compulsory is not obvious. Pooling was applied to
receipts and costs. Pooling was practised for payment systems, grading,
AWB selling expenses and costs of storage, transport and handling. There
was a tendency for less pooling over time in recognition of its adverse
e¡ects.
The regulated marketing system had major e¡ects on grading. Premiums
and discounts for quality were previously unimportant in Australia. Most
wheat was sold on a `fair average quality' (faq) basis, later called Australian
Standard White (ASW). The ability to grow wheats with certain quality
characteristics depends on climate and soil type. The distribution of grades
and premiums and discounts is regionally based. In a wheat marketing
system dominated by pooling and so politicised, there was the opportunity
for meddling with market-based premiums and discounts by arbitrary
intervention designed to protect regional interests.
Until the late 1970s, there was national pooling of handling and storage
and this produced bizarre results. Growers in established graingrowing states
and regions subsidised investment in infrastructure in areas with increasing
production. A substantial grain terminal was built in Western Australia
cross-subsidised by other states. National pooling was replaced by statewide
pooling after a report by the Industries Assistance Commission (1978). This
report was the ¢rst public examination of wheat marketing since the 1930s
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pooling, there was always a leavening of political reality. Land transport
costs were not pooled and growers paid rail freight according to distance
from grain terminals. The land market already re£ects distance from market
and it would have been absurd to pool transport costs within a state, let
alone Australia as a whole. Political reality also dictated that states were
rewarded for their proximity to export markets.
The most serious e¡ects of pooling were in transport, handling and
storage. Rigid marketing arrangements tied growers to state government-
owned railways ö a political price paid for state governments passing
complementary legislation. Handling and storage authorities were state-
owned in the three eastern graingrowing states and owned by grower co-
operatives in South Australia and Western Australia. These organisations
recouped their `costs' from wheatgrowers. It was a recipe for cost escalation
with cost padding and slack administration, resulting in the Royal
Commission into Grain Handling, Storage and Transport in the mid-1980s.
The Commission made far-reaching recommendations. The AWB was
encouraged to seek alternative ways of handling grain and to override state
transport authorities. State-owned handling and storage authorities have since
moved into private ownership, usually by growers. The essential problem of
pooling was that farmers were unable to make judgements based on costs of
marketing and their estimates of its bene¢ts. With pooling, a common service
is o¡ered which all must use. Evolution of the grain marketing system was
retarded. As the £aws of Australian grain marketing arrangements became
obvious to graingrowers and critics alike, change was inevitable.
2.4 Subsequent developments
The 1989 Wheat Marketing Act included six major changes:
1. Deregulation of the domestic market for wheat.
2. The sunset provision on the life of the AWB was removed.
3. The Guaranteed Minimum Price was changed to a government
guarantee of AWB borrowings which was due to expire in June 1994.
4. Representation on the AWB was changed so that it no longer had a
majority of grower members and so that board members are selected on
the basis of their commercial expertise ö including grower members.
5. The WIF was established as a capital base for ¢nancing payments to
growers.
6. The AWB was allowed to trade in grains other than wheat.
The Act was amended in 1992 and government underwriting of AWB
borrowings was extended to 1999. The AWB was given a charter to engage
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1989 Act nor the 1992 amendment was the export monopoly of the AWB
varied. The changes in 1989 and 1992 set in train a chain of events that are
still being worked through. Deregulation of the domestic market is now
supported by a majority of farmers, even though domestic deregulation
occurred against the wishes of the organised grain industry. This is a familiar
pattern in wheat marketing in Australia: change does not seem so bad after
the event.
Deregulation of the domestic market has di¡erential e¡ects on
graingrowers according to location. In the eastern states where intensive
livestock industries are concentrated, more graingrowers can market their
own grain. Producers and grain users are able to avoid some of the e¡ects of
pooling ö basing transactions on transport costs, quality requirements and
timing. Domestic deregulation suits growers with small to medium-sized
farms who wish to expand their business activities beyond the farm-gate.
Domestic deregulation has therefore contributed to easing the small farm
problem that besets the grain industry and has also neutralised complaints
over AWB acquisition powers and interstate trade.
The bene¢ts of domestic deregulation are limited for larger grain users.
While the AWB has an export monopoly, it is impossible for large users to
manage price risks. Nor is it feasible to manage production risks by
establishing grain assembly and distribution networks because large livestock
feeding ¢rms need to deal with the AWB to ensure supply in bad seasons.
The AWB thus has retained market power on the domestic market. For
Western Australia and the Eyre Peninsula of South Australia, grain use is so
small that domestic deregulation is irrelevant. However, the success of
domestic deregulation in other parts of Australia has focused attention on
the export monopoly powers of the AWB.
Removing the sunset provision on the AWB was insigni¢cant except
in one important respect. When the Wheat Marketing Act and earlier
legislation had a ¢xed lifespan, legislation had to be reviewed every ¢ve years
as a matter of course. There is no longer any automatic mechanism for
review.
Changing underwriting to a government guarantee to AWB borrowings
to ¢nance payments to wheatgrowers at harvest rather than a supported
price was a reaction to substantial payments made by the Commonwealth in
the mid-1980s under the eighth wheat scheme. The Commonwealth Treasury
has always been wary of commitments to the wheat industry because of the
temptation for grower-dominated boards to accept less than the best possible
price when world prices are below guaranteed prices. The wool ¢asco
rekindled o¤cial fears that SMAs would put agropolitical interests ahead of
national interests (and even the interests of their own constituents).
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amendments was further evidence that government wanted to avoid
responsibility for the economic actions of SMAs.
The 1989 changes in the Wheat Marketing Act struck another severe blow
to traditionalists in the wheat industry. In principle, grower domination of
the AWB ended. In practice, the method of selection allowed the Grains
Council of Australia (GCA) signi¢cant in£uence over appointments to the
AWB. The most pervasive long-run in£uence on grain marketing was
removal of the government guarantee on AWB borrowings. The WIF was
initially established as a capital base to replace the government guarantee.
The WIF now has deposits of around $A600 million. This is about 20 per
cent of gross revenue from wheat in an average year or around half the
annual cash operating surplus of farmers. With a run of good seasons,
Western Australian growers have contributed over 40 per cent of the WIF.
This is a source of tension in an industry where in£uence in peak
organisations is based on state representation.
Consistent with the chequered history of wheat marketing, the role of the
WIF has changed since its inception. Conceived as a capital base to support
borrowing to ¢nance producer payments, the WIF was targeted in the 1992
amendments to fund value-adding and o¡-farm activities. Most recently,
WIF funds were rede¢ned as the equity base for a corporatised/privatised
AWB. The possibility that WIF funds should be returned to their owners
was not considered. Fortunately, the WIF has not been used much for value-
adding except for small investments in £our mills and similar ventures in
emerging markets. To its credit, the AWB and GCA have resisted o¤cial
enthusiasm for investment in so-called value-adding and only 2 per cent of
the WIF has been invested in joint ventures (AWB Limited 1998, p. 21).
Many Australian politicians believe pro¢ts are there for the taking in
marketing and processing agricultural products. How these opportunities
consistently escape the attention of the private sector is not explained.
Fundamentally, adding value is also adding costs. It is not axiomatic that
products should be processed close to the point of production rather than
consumption; often, it is the contrary, once costs of inventory management
are taken into account.
On face value, allowing the AWB to trade in grains other than wheat
was an innocuous change to marketing arrangements. Mixed cargoes provide
a logical and convenient service to customers. However, broadening the
functions of the AWB brings it into competition with state-based SMAs. A
report by the Centre for International Economics (CIE 1997) identi¢ed the
AWB and private traders as competitors for a reconstituted Australian
Barley Board (ABB) in the event of deregulation of the barley industry. The
rules under which restructured SMAs would compete with private ¢rms
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strong state-based SMAs in Queensland and Western Australia trading in
grains other than wheat. It is unlikely that state politicians and state growers'
organisations will react passively if the AWB invades the patch of state-
based SMAs. If SMAs are allowed to compete with the AWB, why not
private ¢rms? Once SMAs compete with one another, the days of orderly
marketing will be numbered.
3. Recent controversies
3.1 The single desk: albatross or salvation?
A persistent theme in the discussion of statutory marketing of agricultural
products in many countries is that domination of export trade by private
¢rms results in lower prices. Private exporters are alleged to be `weak sellers',
failing to obtain the best price for producers. This is an argument about
competition in markets and marketing e¤ciency and the meaning of `price'
and its measurement.
Market prices have three dimensions:
. an underlying component re£ecting current supply and demand ö for
storable products, expectations of future supply and demand are
important;
. various margins around the underlying price re£ecting quality, location,
credit, delivery terms and goodwill;
. any premium or discount because of market power of buyers and
sellers.
Only the third element is relevant to disputes concerning weak selling. The
underlying price of grain depends on supply and demand in wheat exporting
and importing countries, including the e¡ects of market access. Market
access is the outcome of political decisions. Similarly, the in£uence of
weather on supply and import demand has little to do with SMAs. In
principle, higher prices can be obtained by providing more marketing
services. The Industry Commission (1991, p. 46) pointed out `price premiums
clearly can be obtained from market di¡erentiation backed up services
targeted on those markets'. The relevant question is the bene¢ts and costs of
providing those services. In their study of milling wheat for the GCA
Strategic Planning Unit, Booz-Allen & Hamilton (1995) claimed that small
positive premiums were obtained by the AWB. These were attributed to
`over-servicing' of markets but what over-servicing means is far from clear.
Private ¢rms also have to make commercial decisions concerning the amount
of marketing services provided to customers.
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analyses of the single desk are so unrewarding. Trade data are not precise
enough to distinguish premiums for `market power' from other sources of
price variations.
Piggott (1992) set out three reasons why it is di¤cult to evaluate single
desk selling:
First, where a statutory authority has enjoyed single-desk status for a long
time, as in the case of wheat and rice, there is no basis for comparisons
with a situation of multiple Australian sellers. Second, the type of data
one would wish to have to attempt a direct test of the argument (i.e.
detailed data on prices received in various markets) would be regarded as
being commercially con¢dential. Third, there is the problem of dis-
entangling price premia that are attributable solely to market power from
those that are due to other considerations such as quality and special
conditions associated with a sale (e.g. credit arrangements).
Piggott used sensitivity analysis of own-price and cross-price elasticities of
supply and demand to investigate `how di¡erent parameters a¡ect the degree
of in£uence Australian exports have on price' (ibid., p. 127). Piggott con-
cluded it was unlikely the AWB could extract signi¢cant price premiums.
Modelling methods were also used by the Centre for International
Economics in their studies of barley marketing and grain marketing in
Western Australia (CIE 1995; 1997).
Location provides the most convincing justi¢cation for market power in
commodity trade. A single seller could exploit di¡erences in transport costs by
pricing grain just below the next best o¡er by another supplier. Not
surprisingly, many of the countries (neighbours) to which Australia is freight-
advantagedöNew Zealand,Papua NewGuinea andthe Paci¢c Islandsö are
countrieswithwhichAustraliahasspecialtrade,politicalandaidrelationships.
Market power exists in some markets because of restrictions on market access
and/orsingleimportingagencies.Japanisafrequentlycitedexample.Multiple
exporters would compete away those bene¢ts. However, a single desk is not
necessary to achieve the bene¢ts of these restrictions. Any price premiums
could be realised by auctioning o¡ the right to export to those markets.
Finally, successful price discrimination depends on di¡erences in price
elasticities of demand and the ability to keep markets separate. Customers of
SMAs are commercial ¢rms and government buying agencies able to source
wheat from wherever they please. For claims about the single desk to be true,
customers would have to be ill-informed, passive or lack commercial acumen
(or all three). This is not consistent with most experience of international
trade in agricultural commodities.
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The barley industry has received con£icting advice on the value of the single
desk in recent years. First, the GCA Strategic Planning Unit was given a
generally negative assessment of the single desk by the Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) (1995). In 1996, the Meyers Strategy Group (MSG 1997)
made a more favourable assessment of the single desk. The work by MSG
was followed by a paper by MacAulay and Richards (1997) that was more
guarded in its support for the single desk.
The `Australian' Barley Board is a misnomer because it is established under
Victorian and South Australian legislation. In Queensland, barley is marketed
by Grainco Co-operative Association Limited, a statutory authority formed
from the former state wheat board, barley board, sorghum marketing board
and state grain handling authority. Barley is prescribed under the Grain
MarketingAct1975ofWesternAustraliaandismarketedbytheGrainPoolof
Western Australia (GPWA). In New South Wales, barley is marketed by the
NSW Grains Board (NSWGB). These state-based SMAs for barley have all
claimed bene¢ts from the single desk. Any doubts about Australian market
power based on Australia's share of the world barley market must apply a
fortiori to state-based SMAs. The question also arises whether premiums
attributedtothesingledeskarewithrespecttoanotional`worldprice'orprices
obtained by other Australian states. In similar vein, the CWB also claims
premiums in the world barley market. Are all these premiums cumulative?
(The same confusion exists for wheat. The AWB and CWB have both
claimed separate premiums from their single desks for wheat.)
The ABB was reviewed under the NCP in 1997 (see section 3.3). Grainco
was also reviewed in 1997. The NSWGB was reviewed in 1998 and the
GPWA is due for review in 1999. All the reviews have centred on the single
desk. The spirit of the NCP is that competition provides e¤cient outcomes.
Legislation should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated
that restrictions provide net bene¢ts to the community and the objectives of
legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition. If SMAs have
market power on export markets by virtue of a `single desk', the aggregate
income of Australians will be increased because the terms of trade have
been turned in Australia's favour. This will provide `net bene¢ts to the
(Australian) community', albeit at the expense of foreigners.
BCG was asked to evaluate a national single desk for barley along the lines
of the AWB but the proposal was rejected by BCG for both pragmatic and
economic reasons. State governments would be unsympathetic because of
interstate rivalries and existing local support for state-based SMAs. A national
board would have acute problems with competition policy. The negative views
of BCGon statutory marketing were also based on considerations of industrial
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industry requires close relationships between growers, maltsters and brewers
in an increasingly di¡erentiated market. This favours contract-style relation-
shipsbetweengrowersandcustomersratherthanthepoolingandanonymityof
statutory marketing. The advice from the BCG received a cool reception. The
ABBthenturnedtoMSGforfurtheradvice(Watson1998).
The¢rstpassbyMSGinassessingthesingledeskwastocomparepriceswith
no adjustment for quality. The approach is valueless. MSG then undertook a
quantitativestudybasedontheideaof`pricingtomarket'thathadbeenapplied
totheCanadianbarleyindustrybyCarter(1993).Statisticalmethodswereused
to test whether the ABB could charge di¡erent prices in di¡erent export
markets and increase returns to growers through price discrimination.
Premiums were claimed to exist for Japan and the United Arab Emirates. How
much the premiums were due to market power or provision of services like
storage, grading and credit is impossible to determine from the analysis. The
premium observed for Japan is likely to be the result of restrictions on market
access. A single desk is not necessary to obtain the premium. MSG treated
savingsinborrowingcostsfromgovernmentguaranteesasifitwereabene¢tto
the marketing arrangements, without acknowledging the costs to other
borrowers and depositors. Moreover, debt guarantees given by governments
merelytransfer¢nancialrisksfromgrowerstotaxpayers.
The most revealing part of the MSG analysis was the admission that
premiums are extracted from domestic grain consumers. This is the single
desk at work: not improving the welfare of Australians by obtaining higher
world prices, but in its traditional guise as a home consumption pricing
scheme. The CIE (1997) reached the same conclusion. Like wheat, main-
taining market power on the Australian market is the real attraction of the
single desk for barley. If allowed to maintain export monopoly powers,
SMAs are able to extract rents from domestic grain users.
There are obvious reasons for doubting whether Australia has market
power in the world barley market. Australia's share of world barley is small
and variable, especially for feed barley which has to compete with coarse
grains from the United States. The argument for the single desk is based on
the premise that the international market is imperfectly competitive and
markets can be segmented to prevent arbitrage. This is most unlikely for feed
barley. If premiums are earnt in markets for malting barley, this will be a
product of quality and services provided by the seller not market power.
3.3 National Competition Policy (NCP) and the grain industry
The NCP adopted by state governments and the Commonwealth after the
Hilmer Report of 1993 has the potential to be a major in£uence on grain
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incorporated in the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995. Coverage of the
Trade Practices Act was widened to include all businesses including
unincorporated businesses operating solely within a state. The `Shield of the
Crown' was removed from GBEs. A new competition watchdog was created,
the National Competition Council (NCC), to increase surveillance and
enforcement functions of the Australian Competition and Consumer Com-
mission formed from the former Trade Practices Commission and
Prices Surveillance Authority. The NCP process brought state-based
SMAs into a formal review process for the ¢rst time. Wheat and other
industries dependent on Commonwealth legislation had been examined by
the Industries Assistance Commission and its successor, the Industry
Commission, for twenty years. The Australian wheat industry had bene¢ted
substantially from these public inquiry procedures. Many changes introduced
following these inquiries were subsequently praised by industry organisa-
tions. Carter and Loyns (1996) compared earlier Australian policy-making
arrangements most favourably with Canada.
The NCC `administers some aspects of the reforms, assesses governments'
progress in implementing the reforms, advises on areas where more work is
needed, and provides public information on the NCP process generally'
(NCC 1997, p. 3). The cement that binds governments in this experiment in
federalism is Commonwealth payments to the states conditional on
implementation of the competition agenda. Payments were scheduled for
1 July 1997, 1999 and 2001. Payments have been made for the ¢rst `tranche',
despite misgivings by the NCC about progress by the states. A review of
barley marketing was conducted in Queensland concluding in mid-1997 with
a recommendation to stay with the status quo. The review of barley in
Queensland was not clean. Grainco was included on the review panel and
meetings were held in Grainco's o¤ces! The Queensland government had
shown its hand on barley by retaining the single desk for sugar following a
NCP review. There is a ten-year moratorium on further review of
arrangements for sugar. The NCC was critical of this decision and similar
events in the New South Wales rice industry (NCC 1997, p. 11).
The ABB was reviewed by the CIE (1997) who prepared a report for the
Victorian and South Australian governments. A review of wheat marketing
is proposed for 1999 or 2000. In e¡ect, the controversy over barley is a dry
run for wheat. This was acknowledged on both sides. The most signi¢cant
di¡erence is that the AWB is national and regulated marketing of barley is
state-based. The process in Victoria compared favourably with Queensland.
The CIE report was thorough, independent, transparent and conducted at
arm's-length. The ABB attempted to discredit the report in a special issue of
the ABB Chairman's newsletter (Dingwall 1997, p. 2). Unfortunately, the
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unintentional shift from `shortest practicable transition period' in the
recommendation to `limited transition period' in the accompanying text. It is
a pity the CIE strayed into giving tactical advice. How long is `limited'?
Weeks, months or years?
In the event, barley marketing legislation in Victoria and South Australia
was amended in early 1999 so that the marketing responsibilities of the ABB
were taken over by two grower-owned companies. The objectives of the
legislation were to privatise the ABB and extend the single desk for exports
to mid-2001. Support for the ABB and previous marketing arrangements
was equivocal, especially by the Victorian government. The domestic
market has been deregulated and permits are no longer required for domestic
sales for stockfeed and malting in Australia. After lengthy negotiations,
Victorian traders and farmer cooperatives were permitted to market grain
overseas in bags and containers of up to 50 tonnes. In e¡ect, the private
companies have been given two years' grace to develop a business based on
the trade connections of the ABB before the market is thrown open to other
traders.
Di¤culties in the application of the NCP to agricultural marketing policies
are both conceptual and procedural. Costs of public administration and
industry participation in NCP reviews are substantial. The Hilmer Report is
not as robust in its economics as its reception suggests. There is an element
of centralist wishful thinking in the way federal^state arrangements are set
up. Professor Hilmer advocated removal of exemptions to trade practices
and competition law previously given to SMAs, the professions and GBEs.
Professor Hilmer found an obvious answer to an obvious question: `Should
SMAs be treated di¡erently to other businesses'? Obvious answer: No. This
is uncontroversial in urban eyes. However, the politics of statutory
marketing are tortuous. Farmers do not see themselves as purchasers of
marketing services from SMAs in the same way as marketing services or
inputs purchased from private ¢rms. Instead, farmers regard SMAs as
operating on their behalf. A major reason for this di¡erence in outlook is the
historical role of SMAs as vehicles for delivering assistance. SMAs were a
convenient way of operating home consumption price schemes because the
cost of assistance was easily hidden from public gaze. The wheat industry
was an exception because marketing arrangements delivered regulation but
not much assistance. Creation of SMAs re£ected fears in the farming
community concerning the e¤ciency and conduct of agricultural marketing.
The AWB and other SMAs cannot be thought of merely as marketing
institutions.
There were serious problems in the economic approach adopted in the
Hilmer Report. Kolsen (1995) warned that the Hilmer approach would lead
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policy. Kolsen criticised the Hilmer Report on three main grounds:
1. Excessive legalism.
2. Neglect of the theoretical background to microeconomic policy,
including second-best considerations, natural monopoly, externalities,
distributional issues.
3. What Kolsen called `one shoe ¢ts all', failing to account for industry
di¡erences and rejection of the need for speci¢c regulatory bodies with
subject matter expertise.
Freebairn (1994) made many of the same points, emphasising the neglect
by Hilmer of important debates over public utility pricing. Nahan (1995, p. 1)
predicted that `centralisation of economic reform . . . will . . . not only slow
the pace of reform, but result in much less reform'. There are administrative
problems in the process followed in the NCP. The NCP operates on a
questionable ¢scal principle: in e¡ect, that states need to be rewarded for
doing what is in the interests of their citizens. Improving economic e¤ciency
should not require states to be bribed with their own money. The current
approach to competition policy in Australia is analogous to the rhetoric of
trade negotiations. Trade diplomacy is conducted as if gains from trade only
exist for exports. Accepting bene¢ts of trade liberalisation is painted as if this
implies a sacri¢ce to those making `concessions'.
Itisunlikelythe Commonwealthgovernmentwillpenalisestatesforbacking
out of NCP commitments. Even if it took a hard line, payments would be
lost in a maze of transactions between the Commonwealth and states. The
Commonwealth has leverage in the federal system but it is unlikely to con-
front states for breaches of competition policy, particularly for agricultural
marketing. The economic rewards are small and political penalties are large.
It is far-fetched in the extreme to believe that delicate federal^state
negotiations over issues like the Goods and Services Tax will be compromised
by disputes over agricultural marketing. The NCP is more appropriate for
reform of public utilities and infrastructure. It is possible that state
governments will blame the NCP when they impose their preferred policies,
using the threat of Commonwealth sanctions to convince reluctant electorates
in the states. This is similar to trade diplomacy. Another weakness of the
NCP is that its sanctions are one-sided. The agreement provides no discipline
if the Commonwealth drags the chain on microeconomic reform.
3.4 Privatising SMAs?
In the last few years, there has been constant negotiation between
graingrowers and the Commonwealth over the future of the AWB. In these
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marketing with serious di¡erences between state a¤liates. The need to
restructure the AWB was triggered by removal of the government guarantee
on AWB borrowings. However, the role of the AWB had been under
challenge for many years. Di¡erences within the GCA re£ect con£icts of
economic interests and ideology. The stakes have been raised by the money
accumulated in the WIF. The inherent di¤culties of privatising a trading
entity like the AWB as a joint stock company have been swept under the
carpet.
The initial response of successive Commonwealth governments
dissatis¢ed with the performance of the AWB and other SMAs was to
reform the organisations as they were constituted. Modern management
methods, non-representational boards with appropriate expertise and
professional management were introduced to break the earlier domination
of the AWB by graingrowers' organisations. In the case of the AWB,
these policies could be judged a relative success. However, `managerialism'
cannot eliminate di¤culties of SMAs associated with de¢ciencies in their
economic policies, as starkly demonstrated in the Australian wool
industry. There is a limit to which an SMA can be made `commercial'
without su¡ering the fate of the Australian Wool Corporation where `the
institutional arrangements . . . were neither the ¢sh of market discipline
nor the fowl of Westminster responsibility and accountability' (Watson
1990, p. 12). Business decisions that are uncontroversial if made by private
¢rms or cooperatives take on a di¡erent character if undertaken by entities
backed by legislation enforcing compulsory participation.
The politics and economics of transition from plan to market are di¤cult
territory. There are two approaches for governments wishing to divest
themselves of GBEs or bodies like SMAs: ¢rst, dispose of the entity as a
going concern; and, second, change the rules governing the organisation
and allow other businesses to compete. In e¡ect, the government has
attempted to implement the ¢rst course of action with respect to the export
operations of the AWB. The single desk has been preserved by creating
AWB Limited owned by wheatgrower shareholders. The second course was
chosen when the government deregulated the domestic industry. In that
case, the AWB lost its statutory powers on the domestic market and other
¢rms ö including farmers ö commenced business. The AWB responded
by setting up a trading division to operate on the domestic market. The
trading division was kept separate from the rest of AWB in a formal sense.
Nevertheless, the trading division is advantaged by the export operations
of the AWB because large grain users or traders on the domestic market
are unable to manage price risks e¤ciently if they do not have the option
of exporting grain.
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not without complications. Despite these inherent di¤culties, the option
of reducing the powers of the AWB on the export market by allowing
new ¢rms to enter grain marketing was not contemplated for political
reasons. Nor was the option of testing the market by issuing a prospectus
in a new version of the AWB. Only then would graingrowers have had
a clear choice between leaving their WIF equity in a new AWB or
withdrawing their funds. Other investors could also have evaluated the
proposal.
There are major di¡erences between privatising a trading entity like
the AWB and organisations with physical assets and/or de¢ned markets
for their services like the public utilities that have been successfully
privatised in Australia and elsewhere, including grain handling and storage
authorities in Victoria and New South Wales. There are many successful
private grain trading ¢rms and these are private and family companies,
not joint stock companies. The principal assets of a trading organisation
are information about markets and trade connections. The value of
information is ephemeral; the value of trade connections is also ephemeral
in a market characterised by £uctuating supply and import demand. There
is no logical basis on which the value of the assets of a trading
organisation can be calculated by those outside the organisation. It is
likely that shares in a privatised AWB will not be readily negotiable. Nor
do shares in the AWB ¢t logically in farmers' ¢nancial portfolios. It is
doubtful that graingrowers would have invested voluntarily in a privatised
AWB. This is because risk management will become more di¤cult once
£uctuations in farm income are correlated with proceeds from marketing
activities.
AWB Limited could su¡er an acute version of the `principal and agent'
problem. Costs for farmers (principals) of monitoring salaried management
(agents) will be prohibitive. This problem was anticipated in disputes over the
two-class share plan proposed as the ¢rst stage of privatising AWB ö the
`grower corporate model'. Although reported as if it were a dispute between
states, the dispute is really over the control growers have over their own
funds. The reluctant states have a higher proportion of growers adversely
a¡ected by the current proposal. Current plans for privatisation are modest.
Pooling of receipts will continue as the main policy instrument of AWB
Limited. By default, farmers are paying for the privilege of pooling through
contributions to the WIF.
The plan that has now been adopted was outlined in the second reading
speech introducing the Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill 1997. The
arrangements for share ownership and control of AWB Limited are as
follows (Anderson 1997, pp. 3^4):
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statutory Australian Wheat Board but by a grower owned and controlled
company operating under Corporations law. The company will assume
responsibility for all commercial aspects of wheat marketing, including
¢nancing and operation of wheat pools.
The new organisation will comprise a holding company with two
subsidiaries: a pooling subsidiary and a domestic trading subsidiary.
Shares in the holding company will be issued in two classes: One A-class
share will be issued to each grower and the Wheat Industry Fund will be
converted to B-class shares. B-class shares will be issued to Wheat
Industry Fund equity holders on the basis of one share for every unit in
the Wheat Industry Fund and will provide the company's capital base.
A-class shares will be issued only to wheat growers. They will be non-
transferable and redeemed as growers leave the industry or fail to qualify
as a wheat grower. A-class shares will confer voting rights to elect the
majority of directors of the holding company, and hence control of the
holding company. The A-class shares will not attract dividends or other
returns.
As the providers of equity, B-class shareholders will have the right to
elect a minority of directors. B-class shareholders will receive a com-
mercial rate of return and B-class shares will only be tradeable amongst
growers until the outcome of the National Competition Policy review of
the export monopoly.
There are di¤culties in the two-class share plan. Larger growers in Western
Australia and elsewhere are compromised because it transfers power to
smaller growers concentrated in Victoria and South Australia. There is a
con£ict of interest between A-class shareholders and B-class shareholders
that will be di¤cult to resolve by the board of the new AWB. Interests of A-
class shareholders are served by a high pool price with lower rates of return
on B-class shares. The reverse applies to growers with substantial equity in
the WIF. Election procedures are politicised. After a decade of e¡orts to
make representation on the board of the AWB based on commercial
expertise, the process is reversed.
In the long run, the two-class share plan may not meet conditions for
stock exchange listing. A reason why trading businesses like the private grain
trading houses are seldom listed is that stock exchange rules require regular
disclosure of information and this does not suit ¢rms trading in volatile
commodity markets. Fluctuations in pro¢ts of grain trading would be un-
attractive to institutional and other investors. These conceptual problems
have not been considered seriously in the debate over privatising the AWB.
It has been taken for granted that the AWB could be privatised in much the
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of risk management of the restructured AWB will be pooling of receipts.
While this approach is followed, there should be little risk to growers' funds.
The ¢nancial consequences will not be as devastating as the collapse of the
bu¡er stock scheme for wool when the ethos of `grower control' was carried
to its illogical limit.
There are other problems in the current approach to privatisation of the
AWB. The sequence followed is questionable. An NCP review of wheat
marketing legislation is planned for 1999/2000. That review will focus on the
value of the single desk, wrestling yet again with the intractable question of
premiums available to a single seller. The long-term future of the export
monopoly should have been decided before privatisation took place, not
after. Whether the AWB maintains the export monopoly is critical to the
future of the AWB and its value in the eyes of grower shareholders. There is
still controversy over the taxation obligations of growers who dispose of
their shares. Funds in the WIF are deferred income that should be brought
to account. There might be a case for allowing growers to spread this income
over several years for taxation purposes. However, there is no case for
money withdrawn from the WIF to be treated di¡erently for taxation
purposes than taxpayers in similar situations, such as policy holders given
shares following demutualisation of insurance companies. Once the AWB is
fully privatised, growers should expect to be taxed on capital gains, in the
happy circumstance that there are capital gains on share trading.
The approach of governments and the grain industry to the single desk is
strategic not transcendental. The restructuring of the AWB gives the new
grower company the exclusive right to export bulk wheat for ¢ve years. A
small independent statutory body will manage the export monopoly on
wheat from mid-1999. Immediate transfer of single desk powers of the AWB
to a private entity could have created problems in trade with other countries
and attracted the attention of Australian regulators. Like most compromises,
the situation is unstable. Certainly, not as stable as would be hoped by
exhausted negotiators.
Pressure on the single desk of AWB Limited will come from outside and
within. First, from countries like the United States who regard state trading
as damaging to their interests and/or inconsistent with reasonable rules for
foreign trade. It is interesting to speculate how much the United States
would be prepared to concede in bilateral trade negotiations in return for
abolition of the single desk. For single desk sceptics, the opportunity may
have at last presented itself for Australia to give up nothing for something.
Second, corporatisation and privatisation of grain handling and storage
authorities in Australia have created farmer-owned businesses with the
incentive and capacity to trade in grains. For £exibility in marketing
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grain traders to be vertically integrated. Present arrangements are illogical in
economic terms. Di¡erences in economic interests are also compounded by
regional rivalries. Over time, AWB Limited will seek to control storage and
handling facilities and grain handlers will wish to move into grain trading.
4. Conclusion
The function of agricultural markets is to coordinate production and
consumption in space, time and form. The best way of thinking about
agricultural markets is to concentrate on the economics of information and
transactions costs. The operation of markets is costly and formation of
organisations with central direction saves costs. The existence and size of
marketing ¢rms depend on costs of organising transactions within a ¢rm or
by markets. A contention in this article is that the capacity of markets to
organise trade in Australian grain has increased because of falling costs of
provision of marketing services, especially information. The economic
situation of farmers today is much better and possibilities of competitive
markets in the grain industry are far greater than when the Australian grain
marketing system was established.
It is time to re-examine the assumptions on which Australian grain
marketing was based. Intervention in the wheat and barley industry was
based on the proposition that farmers were disadvantaged by lack of market
power, exploitation by middlemen and excessive marketing costs. Collective
action through SMAs was intended to o¡set these disadvantages. A
marketing solution was sought to problems of low prices and incomes with
other origins. In the folklore of the grain industry, it appears that low grain
prices and de¢ciencies of grain marketing were responsible for the great
depression of the 1930s rather than vice versa.
The `orderly marketing' tradition that dominated the grain industry for
¢fty years was suspicious of middlemen and marketing. Farmers can
eliminate middlemen at the cost and inconvenience of performing functions
themselves. Market structure and industrial organisation have to be
considered horizontally and vertically. The demand for marketing services,
marketing costs and technology is not static. There is no single marketing
system that suits all producers and consumers. Centralised marketing with
pooling does not allow the marketing system to evolve, nor does it minimise
marketing costs. The other objective of pooling was to manage inter-
temporal price risks. In the process, a collective solution to risk management
was imposed on growers. Pooling a¡ects farm decision-making. Choices
available to farmers for risk management, ¢nancial management and
marketing are severely limited. Risk management provided collectively does
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farmers are in competition with one another for resources.
The distinction between economic theory and empirical evidence relevant
to policy-making at the ¢rm and industry levels is neglected in discussion of
grain marketing in Australia. This is due to the nexus between the pooling
concept and the politics of grain. Intrusion of politics into agricultural
marketing is the direct result of compulsory participation of farmers in
SMAs. The notion of a grain `industry', re£ecting collective interests of
farmers and SMAs involved in marketing, is constantly invoked in
discussions of grain marketing. Farmers and their organisations see SMAs
as responsible to them and this is the legislative intent of government. The
grain `industry' is an ambiguous concept because of farmer di¡erences in
size, location and aspirations. Whose interests are of concern is not clear in
discussions of grain marketing. There have been faltering steps towards
deregulation of the Australian grain industry, but there is no evidence that
the dilemma of compulsory participation in marketing has been resolved.
Compulsory pooling of receipts and marketing costs will continue, based on
a political concept of the grain industry rather than an economic concept
recognising competition among farmers and marketing ¢rms.
The second reading speech by the Minister for Primary Industries and
Energy introducing the Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill 1997 made that
clear in stating:
the restructure of the Australian Wheat Board brings to fruition a process
. . . aimed at putting ownership and control of wheat marketing ¢rmly in
growers' hands. This will enable the industry to control its own future
without the restrictions of government control and regulation. (Anderson
1997, p. 1)
Nor did Minister Anderson envisage any change to the export monopoly,
stating at page 5 that `the Amendments . . . in no way threaten the export
monopoly ö it will continue to be enshrined in the legislation. The export
monopoly is a fundamental part of both National Party policy and Coalition
policy.'
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